The French connection in the West's scramble for Libya

The French connection in the West's scramble for Libya
Comment: France has contradictory policies in Libya, backing rival parties and sending soldiers without Tripoli's consent. The cynical calculus behind this could quickly turn Libyans against France, argues Guma El-Gamaty.
6 min read
02 Aug, 2016
Libya has seen widespread angry protests and demonstrations condemning France’s actions [Getty]

Libya, situated on the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea, is a mere stone throw away from southern Europe and is too close to be ignored by European governments.

Italy had colonised Libya for a third of a century (1911-1944) and immediately after the end of the Second World War. When Italy with Germany were defeated by the Allies and expelled from Libya, Britain assumed a direct administration of the eastern and western regions of Libya for nearly a decade, and likewise, France administered the Fezzan region in the south which is the region adjacent to the then French colonies of Chad and Niger. Fezzan is also believed to be potentially rich in reserves of oil, gas and minerals including Uranium.

Economically, Libya stands today as having the highest reserves of oil and gas in Africa and offers a potential lucrative market for western companies, whereas politically, an unstable Libya increases the risk of terrorist threats to Europe as well as "illegal immigration" across the Mediterranean.

It is against this background that the West, mainly Europe, have been directly involved in Libya’s affairs one way or the other, with the extensive military intervention in 2011 under the auspices of a UN resolution to protect Libyan civilian lives being one of the high points of this involvement.

On Wednesday 20 July 2016, French president François Hollande admitted publicly that three French soldiers were killed three days earlier in a military operation close to the city of Benghazi in eastern Libya

The French paradoxical connection

On Wednesday 20 July 2016, French president François Hollande admitted publicly that three French soldiers were killed three days earlier in a military operation close to the city of Benghazi in eastern Libya. The French president claimed that the French troops were "carrying out dangerous intelligence operations" in the country while other reports claim that the French troops died in combat while fighting alongside Gen. Khalifa Haftar.

Haftar has been waging a prolonged war against an alliance of Libyan revolutionaries as well as extremist Islamist groups mainly in Benghazi for more than two years.

The irony is that Haftar has been opposing the UN-brokered political agreement signed in Morocco last December, that produced the new government of national accord (GNA) based in the Libyan capital, Tripoli. Whereas the international community, including France, have publicly endorsed the GNA and stated that it is the only legitimate government in Libya.

The official revelations that France is engaging in military activities in the east of Libya aiding one side of the conflict clearly exposes the paradox and contradiction in France's declared official policy and its real actions on the ground. It shows the French connection with Libya as one that deepens the divisions and prolongs the conflict and bloody violence associated with it.

So why this French paradox? It has been suggested by followers of French foreign policy, especially in the Middle East and Africa, that there is a divergence of outlook and strategy between the French foreign ministry on one hand and French defence ministry and French intelligence chiefs on the other vis-a-vis Libya.

Hence, there is inconsistency. The foreign ministry publicly advocates full support of the political dialogue and the GNA, and according to French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, as recent as April, insisting that France wasn’t planning any military action in Libya.

However, the defence ministry and French intelligence have been actively engaging on the ground through Special Forces covertly operating within Libya, as the French president has recently acknowledged and confirmed.

The French government needed and wanted to show an angry French population that it is taking active retaliatory action against terrorism

Complex calculations

One other possible explanation of the recently publicized French military involvement in Libya, is that the French government needed and wanted to show an angry French population that it is taking active retaliatory action against terrorism. Considering that France has been subjected to repeated terrorist attacks in the last year, action in Libya conveniently and geopolitically offers an opportunity to show its population that it is taking necessary measures to protect the French public by fighting terrorism abroad.

Libya has seen widespread angry protests and demonstrations condemning France’s actions following the recent news of the military involvement and killing of three French soldiers near Benghazi.

Condemnations also came from the GNA itself, which cited in a statement that any foreign intervention in Libya has to be legal and based on an official request from the Libyan government.

This shows that Libyans can become very hostile towards what is seen as foreign intervention in their internal affairs without any formal invitations or requests from official political bodies in Libya. 

Many Libyans have made a distinction between the French military intervention of 2011 which was widely supported throughout Libya and the recent intervention. This distinction is made on the basis that in 2011, the intervention was legal because it was ordered by the UN following the Security Council resolution 1973 stipulating the protection, by all means possible, of Libyan civilians against the Gaddafi regime’s brutality and mass killing.

Libyans can become very hostile towards what is seen as foreign intervention in their internal affairs

Non to French intervention

However, most Libyans believed that the recent French intervention had no legal basis, violating Libyan sovereignty and was undermining the GNA’s unity government which France claims to be supporting, by choosing to support some opponents of the newly formed GNA which risks further polarisation of Libyan politics.

The double standards and conflicting policies which France showed in Libya may damage its credibility and threaten its short and long-term interest in Libya. Cynical critics claim that France was quick to support the Libyan revolution in 2011 because it wanted to re-establish a presence in Libya, in order to pursue economic and security interests.

France, it seems, has a particular interest in the south of Libya over which it had a brief direct administrative role (1944-1951). The south of Libya offers France a natural geographical extension of its presence and influence in Africa, adding to its existing influence in adjacent and nearby countries such as Chad, Niger and Mali in which France wields a very strong military, economic and political presence.

Only time will tell if France will continue with its recent conflicting policies and whether its connections and influence in Libya will gain strength or diminish due to recent direct intervention.

Guma El-Gamaty is a Libyan academic and politician who heads the Taghyeer Party in Libya and a member of the UN-backed Libyan political dialogue process. Follow him on Twitter: @Guma_el_gamaty


Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.